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Abstract 
Previous studies have demonstrated that refugee presence makes host states more likely to 
experience conflicts. Although some refugees migrate with arms, combatants, and ideologies 
conducive to conflict, the vast majority almost never engage in violence. Their presence; 
however, impacts the economy and alters previously established social contracts, consequently 
making local groups more likely to engage in violence. The impact of a refugee population on a 
host economy; however, is conditional. While the factors that make refugees an asset in one 
country and a burden in another have a significant impact on the spread of conflict, they still 
remain undiscovered in the literature. I argue that domestic policies that inhibit refugee economic 
integration, through restricting freedom of movement and ability to sustain a livelihood, have a 
negative impact on the economy and make a host community more likely to engage in violent 
conflicts. To examine the relationship between policies related movement and employment on 
conflict spillover, I conduct a large N statistical analysis using data that covers 198 instances 
between 2005 and 2009. I find that freedom of movement is a significant factor in the 
relationship.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 When Hawa, a Syrian refugee living with her two children in Lebanon, went to renew her 
residency papers to apply for a job, the local administrator’s son threatened to burn her alive if 
she did not have sex with him in exchange for issuing the documents. Hawa did not report him to 
the police because, as she put in her words: “I wanted to call the police to protect myself, but 
what could I do? I have no residency permit. If I called the police, I could be arrested” (HRW 
2016, par 67).  
 Syrian refugees in Lebanon, like Hawa, have been losing their legal residency status 
since members of Jabhat al-Nusra took over Arsal refugee camp near the Syrian borders in 2014 
and killed ten Lebanese soldiers (Saad 2014). In response, the Lebanese government banned 
refugee-employment for both recognized and illegal refugees (HRW 2016). While the 
government claims that the new restrictions aim to decrease security threats, as Hawa’s story 
demonstrates, these policies facilitate an environment of arbitrary detention, harassment, and 
exploitation. Most important, these policies prevent refugee economic integration and increase 
the burden of hosting as refugees continue to depend on humanitarian aid instead of generating 
sustainable incomes.  
 The Arsal attacks demonstrate how refugees mobilize, carry arms, and spread violent 
conflicts to host states. However, the vast majority of refugees almost never engage in violence 
(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). They escape their home state at the fear of persecution and seek 
safe havens in host countries, where they also become victims of “warrior groups,” local juntas, 
and host governments. So, how does the presence of refugees make host states more likely to 
experience conflicts? 
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 Lebanon’s decision to restrict refugee ability to sustain a livelihood and to move legally 
have increased security threats in the country. On the one hand, the stifling restriction have 
forced 70% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon under the poverty line, making them “prime targets 
for Islamist extremist groups who are paying money for service” (HRW 2016a, par 14). On the 
other hand, precluding refugee economic rights and inhibiting their economic integration have 
negative effects on local populations. Refugees, who cannot sustain an income legally, continue 
to depend on humanitarian aid from the host government for prolonged periods of time, which 
alters previously established distribution of resources and lowers the cost of fighting for local 
groups. These policies have also changed the perception of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, where 
they once were treated with sympathy, by the end of 2014, they became scapegoats for already 
existing challenges and the victims of deadly revenge attacks (Kullab 2015; HRW 2014). In sum, 
“Lebanon’s shortsighted policies are setting the stage for a potentially explosive situation” 
(HRW 2016, par 14). 
 A better understanding of the relationship between refugee presence and spread of 
violence can hopefully help explore how host states can mitigate conflict spillovers. After 
reviewing the relevant literature on the contagion of conflicts, refugee-related violence, and the 
impact of hosting on the local economy, in Chapter Two, I argue that refugee ability to move and 
work are crucial factors to understanding how their presence can lead to conflict spillover. I 
hypothesize that host countries that restrict these two conditions are more likely to experience 
violent conflicts.  
 Then, in Chapter Three, I describe my methodological approach, a large N statistical 
analysis research design. I operationalize the independent variable, refugee presence; the 
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conditional variables, freedom of movement and residence, and ability to sustain a livelihood; 
and the dependent variable, spread of violence.   
In Chapter Four, I generate the dataset. Then, I run the regression models and discuss the 
statistical and quantitative operations. Finally, I present the findings, interpret them, and draw 
upon cases from the reports that demonstrate the statistical findings of the study.  
In Chapter Five, I conclude my Independent Study. I summarize the findings that the 
implementation of refugee right to move and reside freely is a significant factor that can mitigate 
conflict spillover to host states. I discuss the study’s limitations and implications. Finally, I 
discuss possible directions for further research. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
There is a plethora of research on refugees and conflict spillover. Despite this expansive 
literature, some serious theoretical gaps exist. In this chapter, I briefly discuss how conflicts 
spread, then I discuss the impact of hosting refugees on the local economy and how their 
presence may lead to conflicts. Following that, I emphasize the role of host state policies in 
mitigating the spread of violence. Finally, I develop the argument that refugee freedom of 
movement and residence and their ability to work and participate in the local economy are 
critical conditions in this relationship.  
 
Conflict Spillover  
The literature does not have a clear-cut explanation for how conflicts spread to 
neighboring states (Gleditsch 2007). At the same time, states that share borders with a country 
experiencing a civil war are twice as likely to undergo conflicts as well (Gleditsch and Buhaug 
2008). In the literature, there are four main theoretical frameworks that explain the contagion of 
conflicts.  
In 1998, Kuran argued that there is a “demonstration effect” by which the presence of an 
ethnic conflict in country A makes the citizens of country B more aware of their grievances, 
which raises expectations of ethnic conflicts, and generates global public sympathy toward their 
political aspirations. Similarly, transnational ethnic ties affect the spread of conflicts; 
mobilization by a group in country A will change prospects for mobilization by the same group 
in country B (Halperin 1998; Forsberg 2008).  
The presence of civil wars also exerts negative impact on the economic growth of the 
entire region, especially neighboring countries (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). Conflict in country 
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A may affect the flow of goods and trade in neighboring country B. Taking longer routes, if 
possible, to transfer goods imposes higher costs for country B. The war in Mozambique, for 
example, doubled Malawi’s international transport and import costs (Sesay 2004). The economic 
impact of conflicts also repels investors not only away from the country experiencing violence, 
but also from the region (Sesay 2004). In fact, Murdoch and Sandler (2002) found that the 
presence of conflict in country A decreases B’s annual growth rate by 0.5 percentage points. 
Slow economic growth and high poverty are the main determinants of insurgency (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2001). 
Finally, recent studies have shown that there is a relationship between refugee presence 
and spillover of conflicts. While refugee migration is widely discussed in the literature, scholars 
tend to treat population movement as a consequence of conflict rather than a possible cause. The 
presence of refugees increases the risk of subsequent conflicts in host and origin states. However, 
the vast majority of refugees never directly engage in violence. Hence, the mechanism by which 
refugees affect the spread of violent conflicts is complex and obscure (Salehyan and Gleditsch 
2006; Gleditsch and Buhaug 2008). 
 Untangling this relationship is more important than it has ever been. The wave of 
refugees from Syria alone is the largest refugee crisis since World War II (European Commission 
2015). Refugees are not only the most immediate impact of conflicts on neighboring countries 
(Sesay 2004), but they also tend to stay in their countries of asylum long after the conflict is over 
(World Bank 2003). On average, refugees tend to stay in host countries for 17 years (Loescher 
and Milner 2005). Therefore, they have significant long-term economic, social, political, and 
environmental effects on host states (Gomez 2010). While the vast majority of studies treat 
refugee presence as a burden, refugees have the potential to induce economic growth and 
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increase the global political leverage of the host (Jacobsen 2002). Refugee subsequent economic 
impact depends on the prevailing economic circumstance of the host country (Sesay 2004). 
Hence, changing the economic environment changes refugee impact on the economy from a 
burden to an asset, which may prevent the spillover of violent conflicts.  
Countries that share borders with neighbors experiencing war are more prone to undergo 
conflict through the demonstration effect, transnational ethnic ties, and economic shocks. 
Neighboring states have few tools to alleviate the intensity of these three factors. However, host 
states may mitigate refugee-related violence through economic policies since the impact of 
refugees on host state economic wellbeing depends on the host’s economic conditions. In other 
words, refugee-related policies may change the impact of refugees on the local economy and 
decrease the probability of conflict spillover. To understand how refugee presence affects the 
spread of conflicts, the following section lays out the prominent relevant arguments in the 
literature. 
 
Refugees and Conflict Spillover  
Before delving into this section, it is important to note that the presence of refugees does 
not always have a significant impact on host states. For example, Albanian Kosovar refugees 
stayed in Macedonia and Albania for six weeks before they returned to Kosovo in 1999 and had 
little subsequent impact on their host countries (Jacobsen 2001). However, under certain 
conditions, the presence of refugees impacts host states and leads to violent conflicts. This 
section aims to explore the political economy factors that explain the relationship between 
refugees and the spread of violence. 
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Political violence and oppressive governments cause the vast majority of refugee 
displacement from their home countries (Salehyan 2007). Violence and conflicts; therefore, are 
not limited to the sending government, but may continue and spread to host states as some 
refugees are combatants who escape with arms and ideologies conducive to violence (Salehyan 
and Gleditsch 2006). These factors, coupled with the harsh violent conditions they experienced 
in their home state, motivate refugees to oppose their sending government, or the group that 
caused their displacement, and rally against them from host countries (Salehyan 2007). 
Furthermore, harsh economic conditions and the struggle to make a dignified living lower their 
cost of fighting and joining rebel groups (Salehyan 2007). The expansion of refugee social 
networks into host communities facilitates the emergence of refugee political structures and 
“refugee warrior” groups, who challenge the host state to sustain sustain rebel networks and 
militant activities across-borders (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). When these groups emerge, 
they turn camps into rebel sanctuaries, and a base of operations and recruitment (Zolberg, 
Suhrke, and Aguayo 1992; Salehyan 2005). These groups not only attract refugees because of 
their opposition to the sending government, but they may also provide them with better standards 
of living and a “sense of purpose” (Salehyan 2007, 225). To recruit combatants, win local 
support, and gain legitimacy, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), for example, spent 
significant sums on refugees and invested in the provision of social services in Lebanon (Gerdes 
2006).  
 In response to these challenges, host and sending governments reallocate resources to 
tackle rebel groups, expanding the geographic boundaries of violence. These attacks can ravage 
the host population and make them more hostile toward refugees. Furthermore, the inability of 
the UNHCR and host governments to separate civilian refugees from combatants feeds into the 
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perception that all refugees are associated with violence, making violence more likely to spread. 
Hence, the presence of armed activities in camps and around the host country creates security 
risks and leads to the spread of conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). 
In Lebanon, the PLO attacked Israeli bases from refugee camps. In return, Israel 
continuously bombed the bordering areas, which displaced the Shi’a population and forced them 
to move to Beirut. The presence of the PLO also aggravated the Lebanese Christian Maronite 
leaders in Beirut and accused the Lebanese government of encouraging attacks against Israel. 
Therefore, the Maronite leadership formed independent militias to fight the PLO in southern 
Lebanon. In April 1975, Maronite militias killed 27 Palestinian refugees, marking the beginning 
of the Lebanese civil war. As a result, Muslim leaders in the country felt undermined and sought 
more political representation by joining the war. Soon thereafter, the Syrian government sent 
troops to Lebanon, and in 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon to weaken the PLO (Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006; Cleveland 2000). The war, which lasted for 15 years, left 150,000 people dead 
and displaced a quarter of the population (Los Angeles Times 2008).  
As the Lebanese case demonstrates, ethnic and religious polarization impact the spread of 
violence to host communities. Refugees, who share ethnic relations with an already existing 
opposition group in the host country, are likely to support and provide resources to that group. 
As refugees interact with local populations, exchange ideas, and expand already existing social 
networks, they become more likely to provide them with inspiration and arms they brought from 
their home states, facilitating their mobilization (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). This is 
especially successful at spreading violence when local opposition groups lack the means to 
challenge the regime. For example, Somali refugees in Ethiopia collaborated with ethnic Somali 
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separatists and supported their political aspirations (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Supporting 
local opposition groups undermines the host state’s sovereignty, causing serious security threats.  
While these examples demonstrate how refugees lead to the spread of violence, in fact, 
most refugees almost never engage in violence. Rather, their presence changes the ethnic balance 
of the country, igniting discontent among locals toward refugees and the host government 
(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Large refugee influxes can also transform demographic patterns, 
threaten social status of local groups, raise nativist sentiments among “sons of the soil” groups - 
groups that draw ancestral heritage to the home region and make up the majority of the 
population in that area - and make them more likely to engage in rebellions (Weiner 1978). 
Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) found that it is not historical or ethnic animosities that explain the 
rise of such conflicts; rather, it is the change in social status and increase in competition among 
local populations and refugee groups, especially when the refugee population is ethnically 
similar to one of the local groups. Hence, local groups fear an actual, or perceived, change in 
their social contracts and share of economic resources. In response to the change in 
demographics, host states reallocate their resources to maintain political and economic stability. 
The presence of refugees also forces the host state to redirect assets from developmental projects 
to combat refugee warriors and provide humanitarian aid (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). 
Furthermore, access to aid influences the host population’s attitude toward refugees. If citizens 
of the host state perceive access to aid as unfair, then they may respond by boycotting businesses 
with refugees and harassing them. Liberian refugees in Ghana, for example, reported that 
Ghanaians would stop to buy their products, but once they heard their distinct accents, they 
would walk away (Dick 2002).   
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Despite the common perception, refugees do not always have a negative impact on host 
economies. In some cases, host communities become more hostile toward refugee groups as 
local groups and host governments “blamed [refugees] for crime, loose morals, and other 
problems in the community” (Jacobsen 2005, 32). In other words, refugees become the scapegoat 
for already existing economic and political problems. The Guinean government, for example, 
blamed Liberian refugees for the rise in crime rates although the country had already been 
experiencing rising poverty after the adoption of structural adjustment programs before Liberians 
even sought asylum in Guinea (Jacobsen 2001). Perceiving refugees as the cause of economic 
and political challenges generates resentment toward refugee groups and causes clashes 
(Jacobsen 2001). In those instances, host states may use security forces to encourage refugee 
repatriation, and local groups may join the security apparatus in coercing refugees into leaving. 
The Bangladeshi government, for example, repeatedly used its security forces to coerce 
repatriation of Burmese refugees (Lischer 2005).    
The relationship between refugee presence and violence spillover is inseparable from 
precarity and economic hardships. Unemployment, underemployment, the struggle regarding 
citizenship, labour rights, social wage, and migration (Neilson and Rossiter 2005; Standing 
2011) aggravate refugee grievances and indirectly cause local groups to mobilize. This 
relationship is most evident in refugee camps, where “refugees are denied the right to integrate in 
the asylum state, yet are unlikely to be restored to meaningful membership in their home 
community” (Hathaway and Neve 1997, 131). Warehousing robs refugees of their freedom of 
movement and right to work (Chen, 2005). Therefore, camps raise the level of precarity, directly 
affecting the decision to participate in homeland activism and mobilization (Banki 2013a). Banki 
(2013a) also argues that even if precarity restricts refugees access to political gatekeepers, its 
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mere existence encourages other forms of mobilization that are more powerful in nature. 
Individual and collective motivations are strongest amongst refugees whose grievances are 
deeply rooted in their de-territorialized identities (O’Kane 2007 and Banki 2013a). The strength 
of their motivation stems from the absence of a homeland where they can change or escape their 
identity as refugees (Banki 2013a). Even when refugees do not employ violence as a tactic to 
achieve their political goals, their mobilization threatens the social status of local groups and host 
governments, and encourages them to use violence to subdue their mobilization and maintain the 
status quo.   
The literature on the relationship between refugee presence and spread of violent 
conflicts shows that the underlying factors that give rise to violence in host states are tied to 
economic demands and grievances. Refugee economic losses, poor standard of living, and high 
precarity levels lower their cost to mobilize and fight. Therefore, they become motivated to join 
rebel groups who can provide them with income and services. Similarly, their mere presence 
threatens pre-existing social contracts between local groups and the host regime, altering the 
allocation of resources. As a result, the cost of fighting for local groups decreases as they become 
more likely to use violence to restore the previous distribution of resources. 
        However, the presence of refugees is not always associated with a negative economic 
impact. Recent studies have shown that under certain conditions, refugees may have a positive 
economic impact on host states (Jacobsen 2002). To understand how refugee presence affects the 
host economy, the next section lays out the prominent findings in the relevant literature. 
 
 
 
   
 
12 
Refugees and Economies  
The presence of refugees, and the subsequent rise in the number of foreign humanitarian 
workers, increases the demand for limited resources in host countries, surging the demand and 
prices of goods and services. For example, the presence of refugees in western Tanzania, 
combined with the drought of 1997, increased the prices of non-aid products such as meat, salt, 
and kerosene by 100 to 400 percent (Whitaker 2002; Maystadt and Verwimp 2009). Although 
prices are likely to increase, host communities may benefit from the presence of refugees 
through humanitarian aid that tends to “find its way into the host community” (Jacobsen 2002, 
581). Refugees also bring their assets and productive capacities to the host state (Maystadt and 
Verwimp 2009). Hence, they have the financial ability, or at least entrepreneurial spirit, to invest 
and create new employment opportunities. Between 2005 and 2006, for example, the Jordanian 
Ministry of Industry and Trade recorded 4,616 registered Iraqi enterprises and around $300,000 
million in Iraqi investment (Fagen 2009). 
Refugee presence; therefore, has an impact on employment and wages. Large refugee 
influxes increase labor supply and increase the host’s labor market. Chambers (1986) noted that 
refugee workers are more reliable, more adequate, cheaper, ‘fed free,’ and more available when 
needed than local workers. As a result, employers find it more profitable to hire refugees, which 
may also suppress wages (Maystadt and Verwimp 2009). As farmers in Western Tanzania, for 
examples, replaced local workers with refugee farmers, wages decreased by 50 percent in 
numerous areas around the country (Whitaker 1999). However, refugee workers and native 
workers are not always substitutable (Ottaviano and Peri 2012). Refugees provide cheap labor in 
agriculture, construction, housekeeping, and catering; therefore, their presence mainly affects the 
wages of non-skilled workers (Maystadt and Verwimp 2014). Hence, most studies have shown 
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that refugees have no significant, or at least modest, impact on employment prospects for native 
workers (Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Fakih and Ibrahim 2015). In fact, new refugees and 
immigrants alike may have a negative impact on other immigrants and not the local labor force 
(D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri 2010). New influxes of refugees in the UK, for example, had no 
impact on the compensations of British workers, but had a negative impact on the wages of 
earlier immigrants (Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth 2012).  
At the same time, local skilled workers may gain from refugee presence. Waters (1996) 
showed that local professionals who worked for humanitarian operations were paid two to three 
times more than their colleagues who worked for similar local organizations. In camp regions, 50 
percent of health workers and 35 percent of dispensary employees left their government posts to 
join relief agencies that paid higher salaries, forcing local employers to increase salaries 
(Whitaker 1999). Overall, the impact of refugee presence on employment and wages depends on 
government policies toward refugees (Fakih and Ibrahim 2015). 
 Finally, hosting large groups of refugees impacts access to health and educational 
services. In the short run, as the population grows, relief organizations cannot build new 
hospitals and schools to amend the shortage in public services. As a result, the access of the 
poorest segment of the host community to these facilities decreases (Chambers 1986). On the 
other hand, some host communities may be better off and reap the benefits of hosting refugees as 
humanitarian organizations open their doors to refugees and locals alike. In Kagera, Maystadt 
and Verwimp (2009) found that 30 percent of healthcare receivers form relief agencies were 
Tanzanians. These benefits; however, are usually limited to locals who live closest to the camps 
(Whitaker 2002). Benefitting “the local community through improvements in infrastructure in 
the areas of water, health, roads, etc.” is one of the measures the UNHCR encourages to prevent 
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tension between refugees and local populations (UNHCR 1999, 19). Sometimes, the presence of 
refugees is extremely beneficial to locals to the extent that it makes aid agencies more likely to 
build new facilities and improve the old ones fulfilling a “wish list including all the development 
projects that the [host’s] administration could not afford on its own” (Jacobsen 2002, 583). 
As the literature shows, the economic impact of refugees is conditional. Chambers (1986) 
argued that refugee presence creates “winners and losers” in host regions; the winners could be 
the local farmers who own land and hire refugees for lower wages to increase their profits; and 
the losers are local workers who lose their jobs to refugees. Often, the presence of refugees may 
have the potential to create inflation, poverty, and even environmental degradation (Jacobsen 
1997). At the same time, self-settled refugees may increase the capacity of the host communities 
through augmenting local and regional trade and creating a ‘multiplier effect’ (Jacobsen 2002). 
The economic impact of refugees on the host state is significant when it comes to 
explaining the spread of conflicts. The literature shows that slow economic growth and high 
poverty are the main determinants of insurgency and its prevalence (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; 
Fearon and Laitin 2001; Sesay 2004). The presence of refugees makes the least fortunate 
segment of the host economy worse off (Chambers 1986), may reduce the per capita income of 
the host population, and decreases the cost of fighting for local populations (Murdoch and 
Sandler 2002). Hence, if refugees have a negative economic impact, then violence is more likely 
to spread. 
While the literature explains the relationship between economic factors and the spread of 
conflict, it does not explicitly state the conditions that make refugee presence an economic asset 
in one host state and a burden in another. This is not only significant for the host economy, but 
also the likelihood to experience conflict; if refugees are an economic benefit, then their presence 
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is less likely to increase the conflict onset, and vice versa. Since the literature shows that refugee 
precarity, which alters ethnic, economic, and political dynamics in the host state is the cause of 
violence spillover, alleviating their economic hardship lowers the risk of violence. In fact, host 
states have the power to mitigate this relationship through policies and laws regulating refugees 
(Banki 2013b).  
 
Host State Policies  
If the human capital of refugees is high, then the host might benefit substantially from 
their presence (Sesay 2004, Jacobsen 2005). However, this is only possible when host regimes 
facilitate economic integration of refugees and utilize their capacities. Through policies and 
regulations, host states have the power to integrate refugees into their economy and offset 
security risks. 
Jacobsen (2005) argues that host states should focus on integrating refugees into their 
economy instead of focusing their efforts on repatriating them. This is especially true since civil 
wars are increasing in duration, which means refugees are likely to remain displaced for longer 
periods. She further argues that economic integration is constrained by three factors: the physical 
environment and location of refugee camps, 2) access to arable land, and 3) freedom of 
movement. These factors ease the transition of refugee economy from the informal sector to the 
formal sector, where the host government can practice its legislative and tax capacities. When 
these three factors are in favor of refugees, they become less dependent on aid from the host 
government, lowering the probability of violence spillover.  
Given the available data, in this study, I will consider two factors that determine refugee 
integration into the local economy: freedom of movement and residence, and the right to earn a 
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livelihood. These two variables indicate the extent to which refugees are able to gain a living 
outside the camp. When refugees are not allowed to leave the camps, they are less likely to 
sustain an independent livelihood. Similarly, if they are not allowed to work legally, then they 
are likely to engage in illegal activities and suffer from exploitation and harassment, facilitating 
the spread of conflicts and violence.  
 
Freedom of Movement  
Host states constrain refugee movement by forcing them to reside in camps. In 1998, 
Kibreab proposed that to undermine the consequential security threat of hosting refugees, 
receiving countries should keep refugees in remote areas where their basic needs are provided for 
by the “international system.” Most host countries have adopted this argument claiming that 
warehousing refugees is the optimal settlement choice to mitigate security and economic risks of 
hosting (Jacobsen 2001). However, scholars in the literature evaluated Kibreab’s argument and 
found that camps increase security threats through aggravating existing security problems and 
creating new ones.   
Most camps lack an effective system of law and order; hence, crimes go unpunished, 
making them more likely fall to under the control of coercive groups that further deprive 
refugees of their rights and subject them to intimidation and violence (Jacobsen 2001). Camps 
are not only attractive sites for rebel groups, but they are also easy targets for raids and direct 
attacks (Payne 1998; Leopold 2001). In fact, refugee camp culture and organization make them 
suitable for intimidation and violence (Jacobsen 2001). Therefore, violence in camps is not only 
expected from the state, or rebel groups, but also from teachers, humanitarian workers, 
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community leaders, and even peacekeepers who employ violence to subject refugees to their 
demands and to sexually assault women and children (Ferris 2007; Khattak 2007). 
Even if a host takes serious measures to keep refugees within camps, refugees will move 
out and engage in economic and social activities (Jacobsen 2005). Once they are outside the 
camp; however, refugees will be moving in an illegal space, making them more likely to break 
other laws. Hence, they will require more policing and will be at a higher risk of harassment 
(Jacobsen 2001). 
Host governments also make the claim that camps decrease competition between host 
communities and refugee groups over employment opportunities. However, refugees and local 
workers are not substitutable and refugee presence has little, or no impact, on the employability 
of locals (Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Fakih and Ibrahim 2015). 
Warehousing refugees also separates them from the local economy, especially that most camps 
are located in remote border areas, and have no adequate access to transportation. Therefore, 
camps deprive the economy from refugee remittances, entrepreneurial spirit, and human capital, 
which have the potential to elevate the host economy. Furthermore, the absence of a governing 
body in camps that can enforce law and order makes economic transactions riskier, which 
discourages refugees and locals from engaging in economic activities and slows down economic 
growth. 
Warehousing hinders economic integration. Typically, camps have at least one market 
where small enterprises are situated. In camps, almost all refugees participate in economic deals; 
poor refugees trade food aid rations, goods that do not meet their needs and preferences, non-
food aid, and provide services for other refugees and humanitarian workers while wealthier 
refugees trade goods including gold, diamond, and currencies. In addition, when refugees in 
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camps demand some basic need, a service emerges to meet the demand. Prohibiting refugees 
from moving freely and choosing where to live increases the cost of hosting and inhibits 
potential economic benefits (Jacobsen 2005). It also obstructs any social interactions that may 
decrease the likelihood of conflict between refugees and local groups.  
Warehousing refugees increases both security and economic burdens for the host state. 
Most of these camps are set up near the sending state’s borders; therefore, the host government 
has to redirect significant resources to further protect its territory from cross-border attacks, 
raids, and militant groups. In other words, camps increase the economic burden of hosting, 
especially since refugees are far from the local economy. To offset the negative externalities of 
camps, host governments redirect assets from other projects to maintain security and provide 
humanitarian assistance. Consequently, local populations start to perceive refugees as an 
economic burden that is depleting their scarce resources. This perception encourages conflict 
between local populations and refugee groups. 
Warehousing often leaves refugees’ essential economic, social, and psychological needs 
unfulfilled (Derouen and Barutciski 2007), which lowers their cost of engaging in conflicts. 
Camps also force host governments to redirect public resources into less sustainable and 
inefficient projects. Furthermore, camps limit the exchange of ideas, human capital, goods, 
services, and economic resources between locals and refugees, which lowers the cost of fighting 
for locals. In sum, as Warner (2007, 209) states: “Refugee camps are ideally places of refuge and 
security, but for some...they are places of continuing violence, isolation and disempowerment." 
 
Hypothesis One: Host states that limit refugee ability to move freely are more likely to 
experience violent conflicts.  
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Sustaining a Livelihood  
The 1951 Convention relating to refugees emphasizes freedom of employment as a 
refugee right. In denying this right, host regimes claim to pursue protectionist policies that aim to 
decrease competition for employment opportunities between locals and refugees. However, 
refugees often work in camps, occupy jobs that locals are not willing to take, and work for 
humanitarian organizations. Even when they compete with locals, most of their employment 
does not affect local workers’ employability. Studies have shown that refugees have no 
significant, or at least modest, impact on employment prospects for native workers (Friedberg 
and Hunt 1995; D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri 2010; Fakih and Ibrahim 2015).  
        The right to earn a livelihood has a significant economic impact on host states. Refugee 
employment positively affects the host’s economic development. With the help of the UNHCR, 
Greece, for example, employed 1.5 million refugees in underdeveloped regions and dramatically 
transferred old farming practices into more economically efficient methods that increased the 
country’s produce remarkably (Betts and Collier 2015). Tanzania, as well, hired refugee workers 
for development projects and included them in its development strategy (Daley 1989; Chaulia 
2003). Similar success stories can be found in Uganda, Burundi, and Congo (Betts and Collier 
2015). Furthermore, some refugees are entrepreneurs and investors who can move their 
enterprises to the host country and create jobs not only for refugees, but also for local workers. In 
the current Syrian refugee case, reallocating businesses to host countries can also decrease the 
tax base for Assad’s regime and the duration of the ongoing Syrian civil war, which may spread 
to neighboring countries (Betts and Collier 2015). 
        Legal employment also decreases security risks. The combination of economic losses 
refugees experience when they escape their home states and precarity in camps lowers their cost 
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to engage in conflicts (Salehyan 2007). Hence, rebel groups attract refugees because they give 
them a ‘sense of purpose’ and levitate their standard of living (Salehyan 2007). Sustaining a 
livelihood would also make them less likely to return to their country of origin and participate in 
the conflict there (Betts and Collier 2015), which makes host countries less prone to conflicts. 
When allowed to work, trade, and run businesses, refugees become less likely to engage in 
illegal alternatives to generate a sustainable livelihood.  
Through legal employment, host states can also raise the cost of fighting. Since the 
incentives to fight and joining rebel groups are economic, allowing refugees to raise their 
standards of living through economic integration should increase their cost of fighting and repel 
them from joining rebel groups. Most important, when refugees have the ability to sustain a 
livelihood, host states will need to allocate fewer assets to support refugees. This will offset local 
population’s perception that refugees are an economic burden and similarly decrease their cost of 
fighting. The ability to sustain a livelihood gives refugees a stake in the host country and 
integrates them in the local economy, making both parties less likely engage in conflict because 
of their interdependent economic interests. 
 
Hypothesis Two: Host states that limit refugee ability to sustain a livelihood are more likely to 
experience violent conflicts.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
In the previous chapter, I hypothesized that host countries that constrain refugee freedom 
of movement and work are more susceptible to experience conflicts. To determine whether the 
aforementioned conditional variables significantly impact the dependent variable, I carry out a 
large N statistical analysis research design. In this chapter, I present my hypothesized model and 
expected outcome, explain the methodological approach, operationalize the variables, and 
discuss the control measures.  
  
Hypothesis and Expected Outcomes 
As “Figure 1” below illustrates, I hypothesize that conflicts are more likely to spread to 
host countries that restrict refugee ability to move and work.  
 
 
Figure 1: Hypothesized Model 
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Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis is the most appropriate research methodology for this study because it 
can determine if the conditional variables have significant effect on the dependent variable using 
a large number of cases, which makes the findings more generalizable. If the relationship exists, 
regression tests will also determine the magnitude of the relationship and its causal direction.  
 
Operationalization of Variables  
Independent Variable: Presence of Refugees  
Who is a refugee has become an increasingly important question, not only in the 
literature, but also for policy makers. Migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, and even movers are 
used interchangeably, even though the political and economic implications of each category is 
associated with different economic costs and political calculations. This study only considers 
refugees, using the UNHCR’s definition: “[a person] owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" (UNHCR 1951, 6). The vast 
majority of studies on refugees adopted this definition (Shacknove 1985). Since 2007, the 
definition expanded to include persons in refugee-like situations “who are outside their country 
or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom 
refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained” (UNHCR 2013).  
Moreover, in accordance with the literature on contiguity of conflicts, I only consider 
host countries that had refugees from neighboring states. The literature distinguishes between 
refugees from neighboring states and refugees from abroad in terms of security risks, economic 
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impact, and ethnic links. As for security risks, refugees from neighboring states are more prone 
to experience violence from sending governments given the geographical proximity. They are 
also more likely to bring in arms and mobilize in host states. Moreover, lingual and cultural 
proximities between neighboring countries ease the integration of refugees; therefore, their 
impact on the host economy will differ accordingly. Refugees from abroad are also less likely to 
share ethnic and religious ties with locals, which impacts how they are perceived in the host 
community. All these factors affect the extent to which refugees are integrated into the host 
economy and, as previously hypothesized, their impact on the spread of conflicts. To determine 
which host states are neighboring countries, I use Gleditsch and Ward minimum distance 
database, which defines them as countries whose borders fall within a distance of 100 kilometers.  
 
Conditional Variables:  
To measure refugee ability to move freely and sustain a livelihood, I use data from the 
United States Committee on Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI). For 2007-2009, the Committee 
published an annual report card that grades countries on a scale from A to F (excluding E, and 
with A being the highest possible grade) on Freedom of Movement and Residence, 
Detention/Access to Courts, Refoulement/Physical Detention, and the Right to Earn a Livelihood. 
The ‘Refugee Rights Report Card’ is part of the Committee’s annual World Refugee Survey, a 
larger report that discusses hosting conditions and policies in details for the largest 60 host 
countries for each year. When a host country had refugee groups from different sending 
countries and subjected them to different employment and movement policies, the Committee 
graded each country according to the rights enjoyed by the ‘least-favored’ group. For statistical 
purposes, I converted the alphabetical grades into a numerical scale ranging from 1 to 5 (where 5 
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is the highest possible score). Finally, “Table 1” illustrates the Committee’s scale for the 
variables in the report card.  
 
Grade Policy 
5 or A No restrictions in policy or practice 
4 or B Almost no restriction in policy or practice 
3 or C Restrictions in policy but wide toleration in practice 
2 or D Restrictions in policy and practice; harassment 
1 or F Severe restriction in policy and practice 
     Table 1: USCRI Scale 
 
 
 
To grade each host country policies, I use Committee’s criteria, which consists of the following 
questions in “Table 2.”  
 
Freedom of Movement Right to Sustain a Livelihood 
 
Did the government confine refugees or 
asylum seekers to camps or segregated 
settlements? 
 
Did the government allow refugees or asylum 
seekers to work and practice professions 
legally? 
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Could they travel freely throughout the 
national territory and reside where they 
chose? 
Did refugees enjoy the protection of labor 
legislation on par with nationals? 
Did authorities tie aid to encampment? 
 
Could they legally engage in business and 
obtain all necessary licenses? 
Did refugees have access to international 
travel documents (other than for resettlement 
or return)? 
 
Could refugees open bank accounts and 
acquire, hold title to, and transfer business 
premises, farmland, homes, or other capital 
assets? 
Table 2: USCRI Criteria  
 
To generate a more representative dataset, I graded the rights of refugees for 2005 and 
2006 using the same criteria. First, I regarded the countries for 2007-09 using the same indicators 
and scale to understand how the committee graded each country. Then, I used the same method 
to grade host countries between 2005 and 2009.  
 
Implemented Variables  
While coding the reports, I realized that there was a clear gap between the Committee’s 
scale, which mainly considers host state policies, and the actual implementation of these policies. 
This contradiction is important since the mere policy does not capture the extent to which 
refugees could move and work freely. Therefore, I created a modified scale for each conditional 
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variable and listed the indicators for the implemented movement variable in “Table 3” and for 
the implemented livelihood variable in “Table 4” below. In rare cases the implementation of 
these policies was more tolerant toward refugee rights than the policy, in those cases I upgraded 
the host’s grade by a half point. When there was no noticeable difference between the policies 
and their implementation, I did not change the grade. Finally, when the implementation was 
more restrictive than the actual policies, which was the case in the vast majority of the reports, I 
downgraded the grade by a half point.  
 
Police officers controlled their movement, extorted bribes from them, or harassed 
them, or asked for documents not required by law; 
Refugees did not report receiving passports or travel documents; 
Movement conditions were difficult for the entire population; 
There were unclear procedures to issue documents; 
Non-state actors controlled the movement; 
Authorities not familiar with UNHCR documents; 
Refugees are allowed to travel, but cannot return; 
Table 3: Implemented Movement Indicators 
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Refugees were not able to access the justice system; 
Employers did not know it was legal for refugees to work; 
There was a wage ceiling for refugees or they received lower wages in general; 
Refugees allowed to work inside camps, but not outside; 
Refugees allowed to work, but not in certain sectors; 
Procedures for legal employment were difficult or unclear; 
Refugees had to pay high fees, or license costs, to work legally; 
Refugees were not able to access the justice system; 
There were no specific policies and/or undefined terms; 
Refugees were not treated more favorably than other foreigners in employment; 
Table 4: Implemented Livelihood Indicators 
 
Dependent Variable: Spread of Conflict  
Previous studies looked at the relationship between refugees and civil wars (Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006). The presence of refugees, however, may lead to other kinds of political 
violence, including individual attacks, battles, raids, riots, and even wars. In addition, the 
arbitrary threshold of 1,000 battle deaths, or even 25 battle deaths, is integral in understanding 
the severity of a conflict, not its mere presence, which is the focus of this study. Therefore, I do 
not distinguish between the different types of conflicts because I aim to capture any refugee-
related violence in host countries. To determine the number of deaths, I use the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset.  
Finally, the policies under investigation in this study may take time to have an impact on 
both refugees and host communities, I expect conflicts to occur not in the same year as the 
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graded policy, but the year after. Therefore, I lagged the independent and conditional variables 
by a year to control for the temporal order of the relationship.  
 
Control Measures 
In addition to the variables discussed earlier, the literature provides a wide array of 
factors that may also impact the hypothesized relationship. I include these variables in my study 
to control for their effect on the dependent variable. 
One of these variables is transnational ethnic ties which may facilitate the diffusion of 
conflicts across borders (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). However, diversity does not necessarily 
lead to conflicts. Rather, the degree to which different ethnic groups are polarized makes 
conflicts more likely. Therefore, I control for this variable using Marta Reynal-Querol’s dataset 
on ethnic and religious fractionalization and polarization. Each country is given a score between 
0 and 1, based on World Christian Encyclopedia data, depending on their ethnic distribution.  
Violent conflicts are also more likely to spread to less affluent states (Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). In essence, wealthy countries are less likely to experience 
political violence because they have stronger security establishments, better infrastructure and 
administrative capacities, and more resources to curb economic grievances and mobilization 
(Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Thus, I control for this variable using the real GDP per capita 
index from the Kristian Gleditsch Expanded Trade and GDP dataset. Additionally, since the 
study controls for refugee employability in a host country, it is necessary to consider the host’s 
unemployment rate. For this variable, I use the World Bank dataset.  
A country’s level of democracy is another factor that influences its conflict onset (Hegre, 
Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). On the one hand, democratic 
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states may allow nonviolent means of protest while autocracies may repress any opposition. To 
control for this variable, I use the modified Polity IV dataset, a scale ranging from -10 (least 
democratic) to 10 (democratic).  
Previous studies also controlled for the size of refugee population, considering it an 
important factor affecting the economy and security of host states (Salehyan and Gleditsch 
2006). In this study, I create a ratio variable to control for both refugee population and host 
population using the USCRI data on refugee influxes divided by the total population, using 
Kristian Gleditsch’s Expanded Trade and GDP dataset. Additionally, host countries in the same 
region are more likely to share social, political, and economic characteristics that impact the 
relationship. Therefore, I include the region of each host country in the dataset.  
Finally, the UNHCR’s 1951 Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol of 1967, 
which emphasize refugee rights and host states obligations, may also indicate the host’s 
willingness to relax refugee-related policies. The 1951 and 1967 conventions signatories are also 
more likely to receive aid from humanitarian missions including the UNHCR, which in return 
gives these organizations a role in managing refugee livelihoods in host countries. Therefore, I 
add a dichotomous variable controlling for the ratification of these conventions using USCRI 
reports.  
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Chapter Four: Data & Analysis 
In this section, I will first introduce the dataset and discuss specific cases that I excluded 
from the study. Then, I will describe the data that I have collected and coded, which is available 
in “Appendix 1.” Additionally, I will discuss the statistical and quantitative operations. Finally, I 
will present the findings, interpret them, and draw upon cases from the reports that demonstrate 
the statistical findings of the study.  
 
World Refugee Survey    
Between 2005 and 2009, the USCRI published 237 host country reports. These reports 
provide demographic information about each host country (including population size, number of 
refugees, sending state, GDP, and whether the host has ratified the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Refugee Protocol). Additionally, these reports discussed refugee rights in host countries, 
such as freedom of movement and residence, and right to sustain a livelihood.  
Since refugees are the core focus of this study, reports about countries that had both 
refugees and asylum seekers and did not distinguish between the two were excluded. Some 
reports oversimplified certain issues. For example, the Committee’s reports combined both the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel without distinguishing between internally displaced 
persons and refugees, which affects their ability to move and work under the Palestinian 
authorities and the Israeli government. In other instances, there were were missing reports for 
some host countries, such as Turkey in 2007 and Liberia in 2006. At the same time, few reports 
did not include the right to work and movement in their discussions. Therefore, I excluded those 
reports. Finally, the total number of cases I coded was 198.  
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Right to Sustain a Livelihood 
Host state policies regarding refugee livelihood averaged 3.314 out of 5. According to the 
USCRI scale this grade is closest to: Restrictions in policy but wide toleration in practice. This is 
true in some cases, where host countries had strict regulations that curtailed refugee ability to 
work, and at the same time they successfully implemented these polices, but with toleration. The 
Committee’s scale; however, does not differentiate between restrictive work policies and actual 
practice on the ground, where refugees were allowed to work, but they were exploited, harassed, 
and abused. Finally, the Committee’s scores lacked a systematic definition that would fully 
capture the degree of “wide toleration.”  
In the reports and statistical analysis, I found that most countries did not fully implement 
refugee-related policies according to their official policies and that they were more restrictive 
than tolerant. Using the modified version of the work variable, I could more closely capture the 
actual implementation of these polices and their impact on refugee ability to sustain a livelihood. 
Between 2005 and 2009, only three instances had more tolerant practices, 51 had no difference 
between practice and policy, and 154 had more restrictive practices than their policies. The 
average for the implemented right to sustain a livelihood variable was 2.949.  
When comparing the mere policy versus its implemented version, the latter is lower. In 
other words, on average, refugees were more constrained in their ability to to sustain a livelihood 
than the actual policies that were in place. The gap between the USCRI’s variable and the 
modified variable represents the weakness of refugee-related policy implementation.  
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Right to Movement and Residence  
Similarly, I coded 198 reports for 56 countries regarding movement and residence 
freedom, or host state policies that allow refugees to move freely and choose where to live. The 
overall average for movement was 3.693 out of 5, which according to USCRI criteria is closest 
to: Almost no restriction in policy or practice. However, the Committee’s scale for this variable 
too does not reflect the practical restrictions on movement and solely depends on categorizing 
host state policies. Therefore, I created a modified variable for movement that included the 
implementation of these policies. For this variable, two instances only had more tolerant practice 
than the actual policy, 55 instances had no difference between the two variables, and 141 
instances had worse practice than the actual policy. The average for the modified variable was 
3.342.  
For this variable, as well, host states scored higher, on average, when I only considered 
the policies. However, by accounting for the implementation of these policies, I found that, on 
average, refugees were more constrained in terms of their movement and choice of residence 
because host states did not fully implement their policies.  
 
Spread of Conflicts  
As hypothesized earlier, host countries whose policies limit refugee ability to move and 
work freely are more likely to experience conflicts. To account for these conflicts, I used the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset, which includes all types of 
organized political violence and provides an annual battle death count for each country. Since the 
dataset provides different death estimates for each incident, I used the dataset’s “best estimate,” 
which gives the most likely estimate of total fatalities resulting from a single event. Additionally, 
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to account for the impact of refugee presence on battle deaths, I controlled for three years of 
previous violence. Finally, the total number of deaths for these countries between 2005 and 2009 
was 65,228 deaths, “Figure 2” below illustrates the regional distribution of these deaths1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Total Deaths by Region (2005-2009) 
 
  
Temporal Order  
 The two hypotheses in this study predict that restrictive employment and movement 
policies would decrease the host population’s economic wellbeing and consequently increase 
political violence. For refugee presence to cause changes in social, political, and economic 
factors to cause grievances and change cost-benefit calculations, this needs time. Therefore, we 
do not expect the rise in battle deaths to happen in the same year as the dependent and 
conditional variables.  Given that the data is by country/year, I lagged the conditional variables 
and the independent variables by one year.  
 
                                                
1 For regional distributions in this study, Africa does not include North African countries; 
instead, they are considered part of the MENA region.  
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Statistical Analysis  
 To determine which regression models would best capture the relationship 
between the variables in the study, I first ran a correlation test that included all the the 
study’s variables. Correlation finds which variables are systematically related. In other 
words, it is the association between variables. This association; however, does not 
necessarily imply causation (Johnson and Reynolds 2012).  
  “Table 5” below illustrates correlations that were greater than 0.33 and lower 
than -0.33. First, the movement and work policies were highly correlated with their 
modified versions because the difference between the two variables can be either zero or 
0.5 points. Second, there is high positive correlation between ratification of the 1967 
Protocol and the lagged USCRI movement, lagged USCRI work, and lagged 
implemented work variables. Finally, the region variable is highly negatively correlated 
with the USCRI work and movement variables, and their implemented versions.   
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Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation 
Coefficients  
Convention Lagged Ratio -0.3924 
Lagged Population  Violence  0.4179 
Lagged Number of 
Refugees  
1951 Convention -0.4148 
Polity2 Lagged Number of Refugees  -0.4046 
Protocol  Lagged USCRI Movement  0.3548   
Protocol Lagged USCRI Work  0.3504 
Protocol Lagged Implemented Work  0.3624 
Protocol  Lagged Number of Refugees -0.3838 
Protocol Lagged Ratio -0.3630   
Protocol  Region  -0.4896 
Region Lagged USCRI Movement  -0.3968 
Region Lagged Implemented 
Movement 
-0.4087 
Region Lagged USCRI Work  -0.4623 
Region  Lagged Implemented Work  -0.4584 
Region Lagged Population  0.5314 
Region 1951 Convention -0.3598 
Table 5: Strongly Correlated Variables and Coefficients 
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Regional Distribution 
As “Table 5” illustrates, the region of a host country matters. The regional 
variable is strongly correlated with host state policies and implementation patterns. 
Therefore, this variable will affect the regression models. To control for the regional 
impact, I ran different regression models with and without the region variable.  
The question, however, is why does it matter? For one reason, the sample only 
considers neighboring host countries, which are also suffering from neighboring conflicts 
that increase their conflict onsets (see Murdoch and Sandler 2002 for economic impact of 
conflicts on neighboring countries). Second, there are certain social, political, and 
economic ties that also affect a regime’s willingness to integrate refugees. For example, 
out of the 54 African countries, only 5 did not sign or ratify the African Refugee 
Convention, which demands host countries to provide refugees with travel documents 
(Article 4). This convention is significant to this study since, as the “Figure 3” and 
“Figure 4,” illustrate the African continent was the source and host for most refugees in 
2005 and 2009.   
 
Figure 3: Refugee Population by Region in 2005  Figure 4: Refugee Population by Region in 2009 
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 Finally, to understand how host countries within each region integrated refugees, 
we need to consider the relationship through a regional perspective. As “Figure 5” 
illustrates, the African continent was second in terms of allowing refugees to work and 
move. What is important to notice here is that Sub-Saharan Africa scored second overall 
although it had the largest number of host countries. Again, this calls attention to the 
African Refugee Convention, which requires host states to “issue to refugees lawfully 
staying in their territories travel documents in accordance with the United Nations [1951 
refugee] Convection” (Article 6). The African Refugee Convention also emphasized the 
implementation of these policies and required host states to provide periodical data 
regarding “(a) the condition of refugees; (b) the implementation of this Convection, and 
(c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to 
refugees” (Article 7).  
 
Figure 5: Regional Report Card 2005-2009 
 
 
   
 
38 
Regression 
 An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is not the most suitable statistical 
approach for this study since the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable is nonlinear. Additionally, one of the underlying assumptions of OLS 
is the normal distribution of the data, which is not true for the dependent variable, 
number of deaths (Krain 1997).  
 Given nature of the dependent variable being a count of events, number of deaths, 
the study requires an event-count regression model. The simplest form of event-count 
model is Poisson regression; however, this model is also inappropriate for this study since 
it considers events to be independent. In this study, the events are dependent; countries 
that had one killing are more likely to have more battle deaths relative to countries that 
had none. Poisson models also assume that the mean of the dependent variable is equal to 
the variance, which is not the case in this study.  Therefore, Poisson regression is also 
inappropriate for this study. (King 1989; Krain 1997) 
 Finally, the most appropriate methodological approach is Negative Binomial 
regression, which best fits the dataset and meets the requirements. I ran three different 
regression tests. The first regression model included both lagged movement and work 
using the USCRI scale, level of democracy, lagged real GDP per capita, lagged ratio of 
refugees to host population, lagged unemployment level, geographical region, ethnic 
fractionalization, and the 1967 Refugee Protocol. Neither the work policy variable, nor 
the movement policy variable had a P-values less than 0.05, therefore, I fail to reject the 
two null hypotheses. In other words, there is no significant relationship between these 
two independent variables and the dependent variable. Meanwhile, region, lagged GDP 
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per capita, ethnic fractionalization, and ratification of 1967 protocol had significant 
impact on the dependent variable.  
In the second model, I kept the same variables and replaced the work and 
movement policies with their lagged modified versions. Again, region, lagged GDP per 
capita, ethnic fractionalization, and lagged unemployment rate were significant. This 
time; however, the implemented movement variable was also significant.  
Given the high correlation between the regional location of host states and the 
independent variables in this study, the third model excluded the region variable. As 
“Table 6” below illustrates, the lagged ratio of refugees to population, lagged 
unemployment rate, and implemented movement were all significant variables in the 
relationship.  
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    (Model 1)       (Model 2)       (Model 3)    
                     violence        violence        violence    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Violence    
                                                   
Lagged USCRI Movement  -0.234                                    
(-0.43)    
                                 
Lagged USCRI Work   -0.106                                    
                     (-0.23)   
                                  
Polity2               0.0258          -0.00898         -0.0769    
                      (0.36)          (-0.12)          (-0.97)    
 
Region                2.611***        2.189**                  
                      (3.41)          (3.02)                    
 
Lagged Real GDP/Cap   -0.000343**     -0.000301**      -0.000155    
                     (-2.88)         (-2.64)          (-1.82)  
   
Lagged Refugee Ratio       -24.56          -39.18           -68.40**  
                     (-1.04)         (-1.71)          (-2.76)    
 
Lagged Unemployment         0.155           0.247*           0.236*   
                      (1.62)          (2.39)           (2.07)    
 
Ethnic Fractionalization    3.651*          3.975**          2.580    
                      (2.50)          (2.70)           (1.74)    
 
1967 Refugee Protocol       4.217*          2.499            -1.778    
                      (2.57)          (1.43)           (-1.77)    
 
Lagged Implemented Movement      -1.025*          -1.225*   
                                       (-2.00)          (-2.28)    
 
Lagged Implemented Work       0.563            0.618    
                                        (1.12)           (1.14)    
 
_cons                 -16.32*         -12.63            6.674*** 
                     (-2.40)         (-1.93)           (3.81)    
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
lnalpha                                                      
_cons                 1.850***        1.831***        1.914*** 
                    (12.22)         (12.05)         (12.62)    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                      96              97              97    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 6: Regression Models 
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Interpreting the Models    
Regression gives a coefficient for each variable. In negative binomial regression, 
the product of the coefficient and the mean of the dependent variable gives the effect of 
each variable on the dependent variable. For example, in the third model, a one-unit 
increase in the modified movement variable decreases total annual deaths by about 420 
deaths. On the other hand, a 1% increase in host state’s unemployment increases deaths 
by around 81 deaths. The three tables below illustrate the coefficients for the significant 
variables from each regression model. While regression provides coefficients for all 
variables, the only ones that are important to the study are those that were significant 
theoretically and empirically.   
Variable  Coefficient  Effect 
Region 2.611294   896.0506517 
Lagged Real GDP Per Capita  -0.0003427 -0.1175955516 
Ethnic Fractionalization  3.651352 1252.940626 
Protocol  4.217165 1447.096132 
Table 7: Regression Model 1 
Variable  Coefficient  Effect 
Region 2.189019   751.1493924 
Lagged Real GDP Per Capita  -0.0003011 -0.1033207487 
Ethnic Fractionalization  3.974607 1363.863737 
Lagged Unemployment  0.2467033 84.65483119 
Lagged Movement Modified  -1.024897 -351.6875636 
Table 8: Regression Model 2 
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Variable  Coefficient  Effect 
Lagged Ratio of refugees to 
host population 
-68.4046   -23472.64858 
Lagged Movement Modified  -1.2246 -420.2145098 
Lagged Unemployment 0.2358709 80.93775487 
Table 9: Regression Model 3 
As “Table 9” illustrates, the ratio of refugees to local population has a significant impact 
on the spread of violence because the more refugees a host country has received relative to the 
size of its population, the more resources it has to reallocate for humanitarian aid, security, and 
infrastructure. Similarly, unemployment level is another significant variable because it is an 
indicator of the host economy’s strength and ability to function under influxes of refugees. Most 
important, there is a significant relationship between refugee ability to move freely and the 
spread of violence. To understand how this relationship is carried out, I include the following 
examples from the repertoire of cases I coded.  
As the reports demonstrate, some host countries did no have policies regulating refugee 
ability to move and work. While Bangladesh, for example, does not have an official policy that 
defines the nature of refugee movement, the Constitution of 1972 enables the government to 
impose “any restrictions” to control the movement and residence of foreigners and refugees 
alike, which enables local authorities to limit refugee movement and residence arbitrarily 
(USCRI 2008, par 13). In April 2008, the authorities demanded local Bangladeshis to evict 
Rohingya refugees from their houses and not lease them space; this announcement came after 
officials denied issuing refugee cards, compensating them for their work, and marrying them 
(USCRI 2008, par 17). This lack of systematic official policies creates an environment where 
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authorities can exploit, assault, and extort bribes from refugees. In Chad, for example, which also 
lacks a legal code regulating refugee movement, the government required refugees to obtain 
safe-conduct passes to leave their camps; therefore, authorities had the power to arbitrarily deny 
issuing and renewing passes, and officials at checkpoints demanded bribes from refugees 
(USCRI 2009, par 17). Refugees, who lack official documents, are prone to arbitrary detention 
harassment, and are incapable of their running their quotidian activities and affairs.  
The lack of documents, or perceiving them as “invalid,” precludes refugee ability to 
sustain a livelihood.  In Guinea, for example, employers refused to hire refugees because they 
could not recognize their documents (USCRI 2009, par 10). Similarly, in Kenya, where the 
constitution guarantees every person in the country the right to movement and work, refugees 
could not own or transfer property because they lacked documentation (USCRI 2006, par 11). 
Employers in South Africa, as well, refused to hire refugees because their documents were not 
the same color as the official documents for South Africans, forcing refugees with advanced 
degrees to resort to informal entry-level positions although the Refugee Act granted them the 
right to work (USCRI 2008, par 18). The inability to recognize refugee documents was also 
present in China, where police officers outside North Korean refugee camps were not familiar 
with UNHCR documents and did not allow them to travel (USCRI 2008, par 11).  
The lack of documentation also eases refugee exploitation. In Chad, refugees had the 
right to run business and work; however, some Sudanese refugees reported that “landowners 
confiscated the property just before harvest and claimed the [oral] contract was void” (USCRI 
2007, par 17). In Guinea, as well, employers did not recognize Liberian refugee foreign 
credentials, which allowed authorities to impose unfair taxes on their businesses (USCRI 2009, 
par 16). The lack of documentations also precludes refugee ability to open bank accounts and 
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limits their access to credit. In south Africa, prior to 2006, refugees could not receive their 
compensations because they could not open bank accounts (USCRI 2007, par 26).  
While some host governments have policies that relax refugee ability to move, external 
factors precluded their implementation. For example, although Pakistan allows refugees to move 
freely, in March 2007, when President George Bush visited Pakistan, local authorizes banned 
refugee movement outside the camps and arrested the 150 refugees who left the camps on that 
day (USCRI 2007, par 12). In India, as well, police forces attacked Tibetan refugees, who 
previously could move freely, to prevent them from visiting New Delhi to participate in the 
Tibetan Uprising Day (USCRI 2005, par 9). Additionally, the general insecurity in Iraq during 
the 2003 War made Palestinian refugees, who used to move freely, vulnerable to harassment, 
violent attacks, and arbitrary detention (USCRI 2007, par 12).   
As the regression models demonstrate, limiting refugee movement increases violence in 
host countries. On the one hand, when refugees cannot move freely and are limited to the 
resources they have inside and around camps, they exhaust these limited resources, giving rise to 
conflicts between them and local populations. In Nepal, for example, refugees and locals fought 
over the limited firewood near the camps (USCRI 2005, par 4). Similarly, the Chadian 
government warehoused refugees in camps and left them with very limited land and natural 
resources that they had to compete over with locals, consequently Chadians “destroyed their 
wells due to competition for wood, water, and grazing land” (USCRI 2007, par 15). The inability 
to move freely also indicates that the majority of local populations are not aware of the situation 
within the camps; thus, while in reality refugees would be living in harsh economic conditions, 
locals may perceive them as free-riders who receive unfair aid. In Yemen, for example, local 
populations, “who believed the refugees have better facilities than they do,” escalated violence 
   
 
45 
against refugees, which even further restricted refugee movement and the authorities only 
allowed outsiders with military escorts to enter the camps (USCRI 2007, par 15). Curtailing 
freedom of movement leads to violence is because when refugees leave camps illegally, they 
become more prone to violence from local communities. In Zambia, for example, refugees from 
Angola and the DRC did not report rapes and robberies fearing imprisonment (USCRI 2005, par 
9). Finally, the state apparatus may coerce refugees into not moving and force them to work for 
profit. One of the most appalling cases that demonstrates this notion was in Thailand, where 
authorities denied Padaung refugees the right to move and travel to Canada, which provided 
them resettlement, as they were considered “tourist attractions because of the brass coils they 
wear on their elongated necks” and businesses profited from their immobility (USCRI 2009, par 
12).  
On the other hand, host states that allowed refugees to move freely benefitted from their 
presence. In Benin, for example, which allowed refugees to move freely around the country and 
choose where to reside, Togolese refugees planted land along the coast with high-quality 
produce, which created jobs for both refugees and previously unemployed Beninese (USCRI 
2006, par 10). Similarly, in the Mayukwayukwa and Meheba regions in Zambia, authorities gave 
a special permission to refugees to cultivate land; as a result, refugees no longer needed food 
rations from the government and sold the surplus in local markets (USCRI 2005, par 6).  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
The purpose of this Independent Study was to explore the relationship between refugee 
economic integration and conflict spillovers. Specifically, I researched the role of movement and 
work restrictions in mitigating the spread of conflicts to host countries. I reviewed the literature 
and found that no previous studies have tested these hypotheses. I argued that host countries that 
ease refugee movement and work are less likely to experience conflicts. Then, to empirically test 
my argument, I coded 198 reports on host country policies and ran three regression models.   
 
Findings  
The findings of the study depend on the operationalization of the conditional variables. I 
coded the data in the first regression model using the USCRI scale. In that model, I failed to 
rejected the two null hypotheses. In the second and third models, where I used a revised version 
of the scale that included the implementation of the two conditional variables, freedom of 
movement and residence was statistically significant.  
Refugee movement directly influences living conditions in the host country for refugees 
and local populations. Previous studies have demonstrated that warehousing refugees in camps 
increases security threats (Payne 1998; Leopold 2001; Jacobsen 2001) and makes refugees 
vulnerable to violence (Ferris 2007; Khattak 2007; Warner 2007). As the regression models 
demonstrate, the absence of recognizable documentation, harassment, bribe extortion, unclear 
procedures, lack of control over territories, and arbitrary detention also have an effect on 
movement, and should be considered in the data. Failure of implementation leaves refugees 
vulnerable to unjust regulations and violence from both the government and local populations. In 
other instances, movement constraints ignite conflicts between refugees and local groups over 
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the distribution of resources. Not having the right to move and reside also cripples refugee 
employability and engagement in trade deals, which further aggravates the host population and 
economy. By taking these factors into consideration, we can better understand the relationship 
between refugee rights and a host state’s conflict onset.  
 
Limitations 
For this study, I used the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants Annual 
World Refugee Survey. This report; however, was suspended in 2009, which limited my ability 
to investigate more relevant cases. Additionally, some reports simplified complex hosting 
conditions. Furthermore, the Committee’s scale does not fully capture the implementation of 
these policies, which I found to have a significant impact on the spread of conflicts. To better 
understand the relationship between refugees and conflict spillover, we need more specific data 
on refugee-related violence that not only considers national battle deaths, but also violence 
around the camps and refugee-concentrated areas. There is also a need for more robust 
systematic data on other constraints the preclude refugee economic integration beyond the scope 
of this study, such as refugee access to courts, coercive repatriation, and access to credit.  
 
Implications 
 This study has demonstrated that freedom of movement plays a significant role in the 
spread of violence to host countries. Through implementing this policy, host states can mitigate 
the spread of violence. Chad, which limited refugee movement and suffered from clashes 
between local groups and refugees over limited resources within camp regions, is a classic 
example for how freedom of movement impacts violence. This suggests that researchers, 
practitioners, and, most important, host governments must pay more attention not only to 
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drafting policies that ease refugee movement and economic integration, but also implementing 
that right. Regional cooperation and agreements also have an impact on refugee rights and the 
spread of violence; therefore, they can mitigate the spread of violence through burden-sharing 
and creating incentives for host states. Finally, the findings of this study help us better 
understand the relationship between economic factors and other forms of political violence 
related to marginalized groups, other than refugees.  
 
Suggestions for Further Study  
 Earlier I explained the critical role of quantitative analysis in investigating the 
relationship between refugee economic integration and violence. The statistical analysis; 
however, includes a large number of cases, which limited my ability to focus on in-depth cases. 
Therefore, future studies should take into consideration specific country cases to better 
understand the complex causal mechanism between refugee presence and conflict spillovers.  
After coding the reports, I also learned about the importance of other factors that are 
interrelated to movement and economic integration. These factors include refugee access to 
courts, lingual assistance, and education. Studies in the future should consider the impact of 
these variables on the spread of violence.  
Finally, studies should also consider the role of the state in polarizing its population 
against refugees. Host states may invoke and instigate violence against refugees for political 
gains. The role of the state in shaping its population’s perception of refugees should also be 
considered in future investigations. 
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